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The Seventh Circuit last term decided a broad miscellany of what
might-be called commercial cases: anti-trust, patent, industrial regula-
tion, product liability, and so on. Of these, three cases developing
the patent law after the Lear case (which held invalid a patent owner's
effort by, contract to prevent licensees from contesting the licensed pat-
ent) were probably the most important and represented the most co-
herent grouping.' The decision of perhaps the greatest immediate im-
pact and most general public interest was that in which the court de-
nied the F.C.C.'s jurisdiction to prevent Sears from constructing the
highest building in Chicago, a building that will allegedly affect ad-
versely T.V. reception over a wide area.2  The quality of all these
commercial cases, however one may regard the result of any one, was
respectably workmanlike. It is unfair, with such a variety of im-
portant and thoughtful decisions, to choose to discuss in a symposium
concerned with the court's work as a whole but one case, and that
neither an important nor a particularly well handled one. My only
excuse is that the problem it raises is-to me at least-an intellectually
interesting one in a field that tends to get short shrift in critical circles.
For some reason or another, trademark just doesn't seem as romantic
to most people as it does to me.
The single trademark case decided last term was FS Services, Inc.
v. Custom Farm Services, Inc.3 It was not a difficult case because
of finely balanced equities. Indeed, the allegation of infringement was
based on the most blatant of bootstrap arguments. But for the intellec-
tual underdevelopment of the trademark law, the case should never
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin, J.D., University of Chicago, 1964,
Member, Illinois Bar.
1. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). The Seventh Circuit had the
term before last decided Business Forms Finishing Service, Inc. v. Glowiak, 452 F.2d
70 (7th Cir. 1971), and the last term followed up with: Maxon Premix Burner Com-
pany, Inc. v. Eclipse Fuel Engineering Co., 471 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1972); Panther
Pumps and Equipment Co., Inc. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1972);
and Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 471 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1972), all of which involved
problems arising out of Lear.
2. Illinois Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 467 F.2d 1397 (7th
Cir. 1972).
3. 471 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1972).
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have been tried, let alone appealed. Neither the district court4 nor
the Seventh Circuit had any difficulty with reaching the right result.
Neither, however, fully succeeded in explaining why that result was
correct.
Both plaintiff and defendant sold a variety of products and serv-
ices (partly in direct competition) to farmers in the same geographic
markets. Both had adopted, as business marks, logos or monograms
that included the letters F and S. The difference in type-face, color
arrangement, and general design of the two made them readily distin-
guishable to the eye. Besides, plaintiff used FS alone, while defendant
used CFS, the initials of its business name. Plaintiff was vis-a-vis
the defendant a prior user, had succeeded in registering its mark,
and by the time of this suit that registration had become incontestable
under the provisions of section 15 of the Lanham Act. 5 That section
is designed to quiet the issue of the validity of a mark's initial registra-
tion. Had the latter not been the case, it would appear defendant
could have urged that plaintiffs initial registration had been in viola-
tion of Section 2(d) of the Act, which denies registration to a "mark
which so resembles a . . . mark or trade name previously used in
the United States by another and not abandoned . . . ., Within
plaintiffs trading area, engaged in either partially competing or related
businesses, there were at least five prior users of logos including the
letters F and S. Only one, owned by Quaker Oats, was discovered
to plaintiff when it applied for registration. Plaintiff reached an agree-
ment with Quaker. The other four users, though smaller than
Quaker by far, were not insubstantial businesses: Felton and Sibley,
a partnership in the paint manufacturing business, sold its product
as FS Paint (some of plaintiff's stores sold paint); F.S. Royster, like
plaintiff in the fertilizer business, had since 1905 used FSR on its prod-
ucts; Farmers' Store, an 11 outlet chain doing a business in excess
of $10,000,000 annually, used an FS logo on its storefronts, stationery,
paper bags, etc.; and Trowbridge Farm Supply (TFS), the smallest
of the businesses, another fertilizer supplier, was doing $300,000 an-
nually when plaintiff registered. Had the incontestability clause not
4. 325 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Il1. 1970) (Napoli, J.).
5. Trademark Act of 1946, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1946) [hereinafter
cited as the Lanham Act].
6. The Lanham Act § 1052, e.g., Douglas Laboratories Corp. v. Copper Tan,
Inc., 210 F.2d 453 (2nd Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 968 (1954). Plaintiff,
manufacturer of Coppertone suntan lotion, an unregistered mark, was prior user in
the New York and Florida trading areas and succeeded in having defendants registered
but later mark, Copper Tan, cancelled.
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tolled, plaintiff would have been in the awkward position of asserting,
against a defense of improper registration, that while its FS mark was
not so likely to be confused with the FS, FSR, and TFS of prior users
as to justify cancelling its registration, defendant's CFS mark was so
like its own-in respect to the initials alone-as to be infringing.
The trial court decided the case on the obvious and appropriate
factual ground that confusion had not been shown. The court would
not let the plaintiff have its cake and eat it, too. Rejecting some
at best ambiguous evidence of confusion,7 the court below found that
if, as plaintiff in one way or another admitted, there was no confusion
between it and prior users, then there was no plausible case for confu-
sion with defendant subsequent user. Deciding on that basis, the trial
court was able to avoid the tricky issues plaintiff wanted to raise. The
appellate court was more venturesome.
On appeal, plaintiff pressed its claim in the letters F and S them-
selves, as distinct from the logo in which they appear. The unsettled
area of trademark law, on the basis of which plaintiff apparently thought
an appeal might be supported, is the extent of the monopoly rights that
may be obtained in letters of the alphabet, and how those rights can
be sustained. A similar, though probably not so serious problem, ex-
ists with numerals-not so seriouis because with respect to numerals
there is nothing corresponding to the extent to which initials and acro-
nyms are used as business, trade, governmental agency, and radio sta-
tion names.
Plaintiff's position was that its initials should be treated like
words. If a mark is basically a name, there is no doubt that mere
differences in design color, or type face would not prevent a charge
of infringement lying when the word that is the heart of the trademark
is copied. Not all marks are names, however, and it is not obvious
in the case of initials or letters that name is the proper analogy. Marks
communicate through both eye and ear. The usual trademark, the word
7. FS Services Inc. v. Custom Farm Services, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 153, 158
(N.D. I11. 1970). Plaintiff's evidence was of the confusion of truckers and rail-
roaders who attempted to deliver plaintiff's goods to defendant's places of business.
There was evidence, also, however, that they attempted to deliver the products of
Atlantic-Richfield and Monsanto to defendant, as well. There was no evidence of
customers being confused, though one may well wonder after American Cyanamid
Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 356 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1966), whether such a
subtlety would today even bear on the weight to be accorded evidence of confusion.
In American Cyanamid, the potential confusion of farm workers in applying the
chemical preparations involved was sufficient basis for denying registration. The
dropping of the word customer from 2(d) of the Lanham Act in a supposed clean-up
amendment, has allowed the Lanham Act to be used as a consumer protection device.
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mark, can be read and spoken aloud. It is used by the consumer
to name the product. A purely graphic logo, on the other hand, can-
not be said; it can only be recognized by the eye or described. That
this is a valuable function is evidenced by the widespread use of
such logos. But they do not provide the consumer a word by which
he can ask for the product. The user of a purely graphic logo then
loses nothing to the user of another composed of some of the same
elements so long as the two are graphically readily distinguishable,
as is the case here. The difficulty with monograms as logos is that
the letters of which they are composed have pronouncable names;
hence the initials can function as words. A monogram logo can, then,
be hoisted by its own bootstraps into a word mark; consumers may
subliminally think the letters FS when looking at plaintiff's logo. They
may even say them when asking for a product of plaintiff's. The ques-
tion plaintiff puts is, has he acquired a monopoly in that function,
which the letters no doubt can perform, when he has acquired a regis-
tration of the monogram logo embodying them. Judge Pell appropri-
ately draws attention to this distinction and faces plaintiffs claim to
a right in the naked letters regardless of their dress.
It is sometimes said that letters, numerals and basic geometric
shapes are available to all, implying that-nakedly at least-they can-
not be monopolized and ought not be registered.8 The cases, however,
are not very conclusive. Where directly posed, the issue has been,
if possible, side stepped. In Goldsmith Silver Co. v. Savage, a case
finally decided in 1915,9 both the majority'0 and the dissent" state
that there had 'til then been no authoritative statement whether numer-
als might alone constitute valid technical trademarks. Plaintiff had
used 108 (its street address) on cigars and the boxes in which they
were sold and displayed. Defendant, formerly an agent of plaintiff,
began to market in the same area a cigar branded 208, though the
numeral was on the box only. A master had found that a numeral
could not, without more, constitute a technical trademark. The trial
court apparently agreed, concluding that "this cause belongs to the
line of unfair competition cases, rather than to the technical trade-
8. E.g., R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 73.3 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CALLMANN] and Dollfus-Meig et
Soci&6 Anonyme v. Richardson Silk Co., 55 App. D.C. 226, 4 F.2d 302 (D.C. Cir.
1925).
9. 229 F. 623 (1st Cir. 1915).
10. Id. at 626-27.
11. Id. at 629.
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mark cases," though it notes some contrary authority.12 On appeal
to the First Circuit, the majority concluded that plaintiff had failed
properly to raise the general legal issue of the protectability of numbers
as technical trademarks and declined to consider it.13  The dissent,
convinced the issue had been properly raised and that the plaintiff had
the right of it, attempted to distinguish earlier authority in which it
was said that monopoly could be obtained in neither numbers nor let-
ters. 14  (As the public interest in letters seems to me the greater, I
think that if numerals were not nakedly registerable, a fortiori letters
ought not be.) In Alfred Schneier Co. v. Bramson,' plaintiff's regis-
tered mark, a simple rectangle, was found valid over the objection of
defendant infringer. The rectangle was impressed in the metal surface
of a siphon head of the sort used when carbonated water was put
up in bottles with levered handles. To obtain registration, which was
granted within six months of plaintiffs adopting the usage, plaintiff
had been required to show no secondary meaning. That would imply
no special limitations at all were put upon the registration of a simple
geometric shape. 6 The case is particularly troublesome because the
siphon head was apparently sold to bottlers, and for their benefit plain-
tiff framed within its claimed rectangle mark the marks of the bottlers.
Plaintiffs therefore had the exclusive right to a frame built into his
product in which to mount his customers' marks. The use surely
verges on functional. Functional design features are not protectable,
even where they are claimed to have developed seconding meaning.1 7
In Sparklets Corp. v. Walter Kiddie Sales Co.,' 8 plaintiff had been
12. Goldsmith Silver Co. v. Savage, 211 F. 751, 752; 4 TMR 268, 269 (D. Me.
1914).
13. Goldsmith Silver Co. v. Savage, 229 F. 623, 626 (1st Cir. 1915).
14. Id. at 631-32 (dissenting opinion).
15. 16 F. Supp. 493 (E.D.N.Y. 1936), a case CALLMANN cites for the proposition
that numerals, letters and common geometric forms cannot be protected as marks,
id. at § 73.3.
16. Actually the only special treatment generally recognized is that provided by
§ 2(f) (The Lanham Act § 1052(f) ), which requires either proof of the development
of secondary meaning or five years use. 2(f) is normally applied only in respect to
2(e) cases. Those are cases in which the mark is descriptive or geographic or a per-
sonal name. We shall see below that this is not a necessary limitation and the 2(f)
test could be applied to numbers, letters, geometric shapes, and perhaps to colors as
well.
17. E.g., Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299 (2d Cir. 1917)
(L. Hand, J.). Plaintiff manufactured the adjustable head wrench that has come to be
known by its manufacturer's name, Crescent. Plaintiff had the same right to copy the
non-functional features as he had the functional unless it was proven that the non-
functional features claimed had developed a secondary meaning identifying product
source in the public mind.
18. 104 F.2d 396 (2nd Cir. 1939).
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denied registration as a mark of a groove around the kind of com-
pressed air-bulb used to charge water and run toy cars. The examiner
said that the groove lacked the distinctiveness that would allow it to
indicate origin or ownership. He then reversed his stand and allowed
publication in the Patent Office Gazette. That generated an interfer-
ence proceeding on the part of Kidde, another compressed air bulb
manufacturer. Kidde pressed the original argument of the examiner,
but the court found it unnecessary to decide that issue because plain-
tiff had also applied for a patent on the container and had, therein,
asserted that the groove was a functional design feature, which meant
it was not protectible as a trademark in any event.' 9
Did the principle suggested exist, it would be as if letters, num-
erals and perhaps simple geometric figures were to be treated like col-
ors, which, though they may be an element of a total mark are not
in themselves protectible.20  The analogy is not unreasonable because
the pallete of the alphabet is almost as restricted as the colorist's. The
point is clearly demonstrated in the instant case. F and S keep recur-
ring in the market area, partly because they are initial letters of many
words (F-farm, farmer, fertilizer, federal; S-sales, supply, service,
store) related to the kind of business the parties are in, but also because
one person's given and middle names begin with them, and two people
whose last names begin one with F, one with S joined in partnership.
The trouble with asserting a principle with respect to letters (with
which I am here primarily concerned) that is of the same breadth
and certainty as the color rule is that in fact so many letter marks
have been both registered and given judicial protection.2 We can be
fairly sure when a court is convinced the letters are really being used
as grade marks rather than to indicate common origin they will be
denied protection. But where letters are clearly used as identifiers
19. See supra note 17.
20. E.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795 (3rd Cir. 1949).
The court in notes 10 and 11 (Id. at 798-99) distinguished the cases on which plaintiff
relied on the ground that they all involved the use of color in a distinctive form.
Campbell, by contrast, was claiming all half red half white labels for food products
(and all shades of red in that combination). The court did not consider plaintiff's
simple, sweeping color combination to have obtained that design distinctiveness that will
allow color to be protected as a mark element.
21. While it is in fact true that the color rule is more uniformly applied (see
note 20 supra), it may be that this is only the case for the practical reason that color
names are so imprecise-as noted in the Campbell case, red covers a very wide range
of tones-and therefore as we describe them, their range seems even more limited
than the 26 discrete elements of the alphabet. If so, the reasoning suggested here for
dealing with letters, numbers, and geometric forms would deal adequately with colors
as well. The reasoning of a case like Campbell certainly would support that conclusion.
TRADEMARKS
of origin, it seems highly likely they will be protected. Two dozen
or more, primarily letter marks are listed as an example by the author
of the standard trademark treatise.22  Familiar ones are A & P, R.C.A.,
and G.E.
The most that was ever contended for, we must remember how-
ever, is that naked letters, numerals, or geometric shapes cannot be
protected. That is how the master put the matter in respect to the
mark 108 on cigars. There has never been a contention that letters
(again, our central interest) cannot be protected as marks when they
are, as the master put it, "associated with some name or device to
characterize and distinguish them. '23  There is no doubt that F.S.
Service Inc.'s mark meets that test. The characterizing devices are
simple but elegant-the bold sans-serif type in black, framed by a red
stripe in the shape of a canted quadrilateral, two diagonally opposite
corners of which are rounded. It is a device familiar to anyone who
has driven Illinois highways. Further, it has never been denied that
naked letters may be entitled at least to limited protection under the
common law of unfair competition. I cannot claim to have reviewed
all the cases of letter protection to see whether on their facts any signifi-
cant portion of them violate the rule as here more fully expressed.
In a field where courts have long been criticized for their inconsistency,
that some cases should violate the principle (presuming it exists) ought
neither surprise nor seriously disturb us.
Treatment of letter marks by analogy to color marks is treatment
of them as if they operated exclusively as visual marks-logos-and
never as word marks. The implication is that letters are part of a
visual vocabulary open to all and that when combined into distinctive
designs, and then only, can they be monopolized. It would seem to
follow that the monopoly would be in them only as visual images and
not preclude uses not visually confusing, even if possibly aurally con-
fusing. Something like that is certainly what the master was saying
in the Goldsmith case.
Surely, however, we want to give some recognition to letter marks
that in fact operate as distinctive words used to identify origin and
that are used by customers to name and ask for products. Were there
22. CALLmA1 N § 73.3. Lists with more extended comment can be found in
two articles by Greenberg, Initials as Trade-Marks, 16 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 367 (1934)
and The Grouped Letter Type of Mark, 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 299 (1948). The latter
includes a several page table listing all cases through the date of the article.
23. Goldsmith Silver Co. v. Savage, 229 F. 623, 624 (1st Cir. 1915). Compare
the reasoning re color in the Campbell case, supra note 20.
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no distinctive design aspects to A & P, R.C.A. or G.E., we would
still want to recognize rights in those letter combinations, largely inde-
pendent of design, just as with any normal word mark, for they have
a clearly developed secondary meaning and in their capacity as words
a commercial value that courts should be loath to destroy.
Pell, J., for the court, bravely tackles from another point the prob-
lem how much protection in the letters themselves is to be given mon-
ogram marks. Unfortunately, he leads us into a cul-de-sac. But the
effort is instructive nonetheless. He considers first the protection given
to words. Not all words, he notes, are given protection under the
same circumstances or to the same extent. Those that are generic or
descriptive rather than arbitrary or made-up can be protected only
when they have obtained what is called secondary meaning-that is,
when they have come to be recognized in the marketplace as identifying
the source of the good rather than as characterizing or naming the
good itself. The same is true of geographic and personal names.24
Many descriptive words have obtained secondary meaning. Familiar
examples include Book-of-the-Month Club, National Geographic So-
ciety, TV Guide, U-Drive-it. All literally describe the business engaged
in or the product, but all, through use, have come to be identified
with particular organizations using the marks. Marks of this sort are
protected, but are called weak and are given less protection than those
that are strong by virtue of being fanciful or arbitrary. The desire
to effectively distinguish products by their marks is in large measure
over-balanced in their case by the need of others to use the same words
to describe similar products or businesses.
Judge Pell offers the suggestion that initials should be treated in
exactly the same way. as the words they may be taken to stand for.
The unprotected initial would be the beginning letter of a word that
is itself, without proof of secondary meaning, unprotectible. Such a
letter could be protected only when it had been shown to have devel-
oped a secondary meaning. Judge Pell would find for defendant, then,
because plaintiff's particular FS stood for farm supply, a descriptive
term, and no adequate proof had been offered that FS as initials had de-
veloped a secondary meaning-none that there was a belief in the public
that the initials alone identified plaintiff as a source. The implication
is that if initials are chosen arbitrarily, they ought to be protected as
strong marks, without proof of secondary meaning. 25
24. The Lanham Act § 1052(e) & (f).
25. A similar argument had been made for defendants where the allegedly in-
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This is surely not a satisfactory result. As Callmann has said, "It
is evident . . . that numerals or letters actually describe nothing and
have no patent connection with the article or its characteristics. 'The
letters themselves do not suggest anything, and require explanation
[Judge Pell would say "expigetic words"] before any meaning can be
attached to them.' "26 Without more, we do not know if the F and
S of FS Services, Inc. are the initials of founding partners' last names;
perhaps they stand for the name of the elderly, kind auntie, who, upon
the death of the mother of the firm's president, took him to her bosom;
perhaps FS is without more the full name of the horse bet on by the
firm's president, whose victory provided the capital with which he got
started. In fact, prior to registering its mark, plaintiff's business name
had been Illinois Farm Supply, and the FS of its new name was prob-
ably derived from the farm supply portion of that older name.27  Is
there any reason why a set of initials chosen under these circumstances
should be less likely to obtain protection than the same initials derived
from nondescriptive sources? It hardly seems so.
In fact, however, in this particular case, the letters had ceased
to serve as initials of a descriptive business name, for plaintiff had
abandoned that name, adopting as business name the initials them-
selves. Therefore, to the person not knowing their history the initials
would appear to be perfectly arbitrary, and in consequence likely to
cause none of the problems occasioned by the adoption of descriptive
words. As a result, on Judge Pell's theory, plaintiff's case seems on
the facts then far stronger than it ought.
Judge Pell evades the problem that plaintiff's use has arguably be-
come arbitrary by making descriptiveness an objective rather than a sub-
jective issue. It is not tested by plaintiff's use but by the fact that in
the trade F and S are the initials of words-farm, service, store, etc.-
that are in frequent use. The implication is that where F and S were
in fact derived from Felton and Sibley, the real names of the founding
partners, and if Felton and Sibley were in the farm supply business
fringing letters used by defendant were initials of his name. Defendants claimed that
the right to use the initials of their names ought to be treated the same as the generous
right, even when some confusion might result, to use one's name itself, as in S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427 (2nd Cir. 1940). Such an argument
was at least twice rejected on the grounds that the initial is not the word from
which it is derived. W.B. Mfg. Co. v. Rubenstein, 236 Mass. 215, 10 TMR 368
(1920); William P. Goldman & Bros., Inc. v. Samuel Goldstein, 15 TMR 540 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. 1925).
26. CALLMANN § 73.2 and note 25 supra.
27. FS Services Inc. v. Custom Farm Services, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 153, 154
(N.D. M11. 1970).
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that their initials might still be treated as descriptive, hence weak,
hence in need of proof of secondary meaning. 8 I cannot help but
conclude that none of the distinctions based upon this theory makes
much sense. Yet there is a reason behind its apparent madness.
I have a suggestion for another approach that will, I hope, appeal
to Judge Pell as both luculent and astutious, two more words I've
learned from him. The reason this case came out right at the appellate
level is that the court applied to the initials FS the same standards
of proof of secondary meaning that is required where a mark is a
generic or descriptive word. It seems to me it might make more sense
to treat all initials not as colors, but as descriptive, regardless of the
words from which they may have been derived. One would do this
not because they are descriptive, but because treatment as descriptive
would require the establishment of secondary meaning as a precondi-
tion to any protection. This would not accord with the one traditional
rule expression that letters and numbers are not nakedly appropriable
under any circumstances, but it would accord with the reality that let-
ters and numbers are protected, if not inevitably, not infrequently ei-
ther, in their potential function as names of products and services. The
only reason granting any monpoly in letters of the alphabet for putting
any limit on the public right to use them, is that the letters have in
fact come to operate in the public mind as name-marks. If there
were a way of treating letters as descriptive, federal registration would
require either proof of secondary meaning or five years continuous
use as a mark. There is, however, as we have seen, no obvious
way that a letter could be called descriptive in the meaning of section
2(e) of the Act, and hence apparently no way of making a letter-mark
subject to the requirement of 2(f).
That conclusion is, however, not a necessary one. There is at
least one circumstance other than a words falling within 2(e) (the
descriptive word provision) that a mark's registeribility can be tested
under 2(f) (the proof of secondary meaning provision). Section 2
of the Act says that no mark "by which the goods of the applicant
can be distinguished" should be denied registration.2" There then
follow five exceptions: 2(a) through 2(e), the first four of which
are absolute. Section 2(f), while usually read as referring to 2(e),
in fact asserts on its face that it applies to all of section 2 except 2(a)
28. Of course, if one followed Judge Pell to the bitter end, FS as the initials of
personal names would likewise be weak marks because personal names are weak and
subject to registration only under 2(f). The Lanham Act § 1052(e) & (f).
29. The Lanham Act § 1052.
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through 2(d). It therefore refers to the three line introductory phrase
as well as to 2(e). That introductory phrase includes the little-noticed
requirement that a mark be capable of distinguishing goods: "No trade
mark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from
the goods of others shall be refused registration . . . ." While little
noticed, this requirement has not gone completely without remark."0
It is perfectly proper to question whether initials are, without more,
capable of distinguishing goods. The question is raised on the same
principle that standard geometric forms-rectangles, diamonds, circles-
are, without more said to be incapable of distinguishing goods and hence
not subject to exclusive appropriation. 31 The problem is that they are
in such common use. The same is clearly true of initials, as the instant
case amply demonstrates. Confusingly similar initials are in use all over
the midwestem agricultural market. The initials FS by themselves
would distinguish nothing. It is plaintiff's elegant logo, backed with
$15,000,000 in advertising,12 that is the origin of the distinctiveness.
Courts, as we have noticed, have from time to time decided
that a claimed mark failed to meet the distinctiveness test and hence
was unregisterable or at least generally not to be treated as a technical
mark."8 If the Lanham Act be found to require in section 2 that
for registration a mark must be capable of distinguishing goods, an
applicant would have to make a case in the face of an assertion, raised
either by an examiner or in an opposition proceeding, that a naked
letter, number, a group of either, or a color or geometrical form was
inherently incapable of distinguishing. The applicant could make one
of two responses, either of which properly supported, would provide
a basis for registration. Each, however, would have a different result.
One response an applicant might make is that the initial mark
is associated with some name or device to characterize and distinguish
it from other uses of the same letters. The claim, in other words,
would be that the mark is visually distinguishable from other uses of
the same or similar letters or numbers. Were the test of distinctiveness
met on this ground, the claim would be limited to the logo as a whole
30. CALLMANN § 69; Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 573 (10th
Cir. 1946); Sparklets Corp. v. Walter Kiddie Sales, 104 F.2d 396 (2nd Cir. 1939);
Goldsmith Silver Co v. Savage, 229 F. 623 (1st Cir. 1915).
31. CALLMANN § 73.1. Contra Alfred Schneider Co. v. Bronson, 16 F. Supp.
493 (E.D.N.Y. 1936). Obviously (it seems to me) erroneous. See text at note 8
supra.
32. FS Services, Inc. v. Custom Farm Services, Inc., 471 F.2d 671, 672 n.2 (7th
Cir. 1972).
33. See note 30 supra.
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and exclusive right in the numbers or letters no more a consequence
than would be an exclusive right in the colors used. That, it seems
to me, is a proper description of the position of plaintiff in the instant
case. It was attempting to convert this visual distinctiveness-ample
basis for registration for use as a logo-into an exclusive right in the
letters.
An arrangement of letters claimed incapable of distinguishing
goods might also be registered upon proof of its having developed a
secondary meaning under 2(f), which would be direct evidence of the
fact that the mark is succeeding in distinguishing. Proof of secondary
meaning could refer either to the visual or verbal element of the mark.
Where proof of secondary meaning was offered, the likelihood would
be that plaintiff was claiming the verbal use of the mark as a name
for his product or service. (Where only the visual element is an issue,
visual examination without reference to 2(f) and secondary meaning,
would likely be sufficient to dispose of the claim.) One can conceive
of a case, however, where the visual distinctiveness issue is sufficiently
uncertain to require proof of secondary meaning to establish even a
right to register the visual aspect of the mark. It would have to be
made clear in such a case exactly what was being contended for and
what granted, but protection of the initial, distinctive and used as a
name, could through this method be obtained.
Section 2(f) includes a provision that five years continuous use
prior to application creates a presumption that secondary meaning has
been obtained. By obviating, in that way the need to inquire into
the nature of the secondary meaning claimed, the registration of a letter
or number mark under this proviso would be ambiguous. I see no
way to avoid this ambiguity without raising at application exactly the
proof problem that the five-year clause was designed to eliminate.
I do not think, however, that this creates a fatal problem for this
approach. For even after the rights in a mark become incontestable,
it is possible to consider just what those uncontestable rights are. That,
in effect, is what Judge Pell was doing. Therefore, the question
whether a naked right in letters or numbers attached to a mark right
obtained under the five-year presumption rule remains open regardless
of the tolling of the incontestability clause.3 4
If this analysis is correct, I emphasize, no rights in letters or
numbers as such arise unless the applicant meets the standard of 2(f).
34. The Lanham Act § 1065.
TRADEMARKS
Where this has not been the case, it may be presumed that the letter
or number had been accompanied by design features that made it cap-
able of distinguishing as a monogram or logo, but that no rights have
been obtained in the letters themselves. The same argument should
apply to numbers, colors, and simple geometric forms. The lack of
ability to distinguish under section 2 is the measure of the utility
of the basic elements of communication to all the public. It is not
a separate or new standard suggested here. It is but a different way
of looking at the long recognized priority of the public's right to the
fundamental elements of verbal and symbolic communication. These
elements do not distinguish because of the universality of their use.35
35. This interpretation is supported by the more full explication of "capable of
distinguishing" to be found in the Trademark Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 211 § 79, where it
states:
The commissioner of patents shall not receive and record any proposed trade-
mark . . . which is merely the name of a person, firm, or corporation only,
unaccompanied by a mark sufficient to distinguish it from the name when used
by other persons. ...
If what is merely a person's name is incapable of distinguishing goods without the
addition of some device, it would seem to follow a fortiori that the same would be true
of the initials standing for the same name. The point regarding personal names is
expanded upon in McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1877). Leidersdorf v.
Flint, 13 AMER. L. REv. 390, 391 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1878) (Harlan, Circuit Justice,
concurring), is not to the contrary. Though it is said there that a mark may consist
of a letter, it also says a mark may consist of a name. There is no effort in the
context to indicate the circumstances under which either may be true.
